



Looking Glass Companion Guide

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This companion guide is offered to further explain concepts the presenters have discussed during the training, as well as to provide a space to write down notes, ideas, and concepts.

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
Looking Glass Overview

Looking Glass is made up of two balancing set of elements, escalating and mitigating elements. The escalating elements represent an increased acceleration in the overall dangerousness based on the qualities of the written content. The mitigating elements serve to lessen the concern and reduce the overall risk of dangerousness. These elements can then be observed in combination, to help better inform an in-person threat assessment process as outlined in Harm to Others (Hart and Logan, 2011; Van Brunt, 2015a; Douglas et al., 2014; United States Postal Service [USPS], 2007; Turner & Gelles, 2003; O'Toole, 2002) and fuel intervention efforts (Schiemann & Molnar, 2019; Hart & Logan, 2011).

Looking Glass is an expert system, rather than a psychological test. This approach was first developed by Edward Feigenbaum at Stanford in the 1970s. These systems are designed to take accumulated experience and design a set of rules for applying knowledge to a particular task or scenario. When analyzing written threat and social media posts, the process outlined in this chapter will be useful for teams looking to apply current research and case examples to new content they come across to better gauge intervention efforts. The intervention process itself also borrows from the Structured Professional Judgement Model (SPJ) (Hart and Logan, 2011; Van Brunt, 2015b), which works to identify risk factors, apply them to a particular case, develop a formulation of risk and plan for interventions based on the expressed risk. This combination of modeling between expert systems and SPJ allows for non-clinical staff on BIT/CARE teams to bring the research and knowledge base to the forefront of the decision-making process. This is different from a psychological test or assessment, which is more limited to clinical staff and is targeted to specific populations.

Looking Glass Research Support

The authors reviewed 206 cases, 113 (55%) active attacks and 93 (45%) non-imminent threats. Cases that were placed in the **active attacks** catalog include those where an attack took place or was imminent. Imminent cases involve those with a clear plan of attack or substantive threat of attack and where the perpetrator obtained weapons in order to complete the attack. In some cases, the attack was thwarted in the late stages of planning and in some the attacker was already beginning the attack when it was thwarted, but in either case, the threat was substantive and had a high probability of completion. The secondary category of cases included those with writing that was intended to troll, related to an attack that was **non-imminent**, or the threat was transient in nature.



Notes

Out of the 113 active attacks, 79% (89 out of 113) involved people shot, injured or killed (including just the attacker killed). In terms of location of the attacks or threats for all 206 cases, 16% (32) incidents were at colleges or universities, 61% (126) at K-12 settings, 7% (15) at a workplace, 2% (4) at Walmart, 2% (4) law enforcement/naval base, 1% (3) at a place of worship, and 11% (22) other locations.

When examining the remaining 189 cases for the manner in which written content was shared, 5% (10) involved essays, creative writing, speech, story or poem, 3% (6) involved graffiti, 8% (16) were journal entries, 20% (37) involved letters or emails, 7% (13) involved manifestos, 7% (13) were notes or notebooks, photos and plans, 46% (87) were over social media, 5% (9) were over text, and 8% (15) involved videos. Of the total number of cases reviewed, 92% (189) of cases had some form of leakage or communication with 42% (87) occurring through social media. Keep in mind, many cases involve multiple types of leakage and the numbers above reflect that. Of note, 6% (13) had detailed manifestos (Appendix: 8, 9, 16, 44, 61, 70, 71, 84, 87, 93, 94, 96, 138).

[206] Details from Cases	[113] Active, Imminent, Substantive	[93] Trolling, Non-Imminent, Transient
People shot, injured or killed (or attacker killed):	79%	0%
Author dies by suicide (include killed by police)	42%	0%
Author was killed in 'suicide by cop':	4%	0%
Written or verbal suicidal content (and author suicide):	32%	0%
Written or verbal suicidal content (author lives):	31%	1%
Commits suicide with no suicidal communication:	9%	0%
References a previous attack:	41%	12%
References fame seeking or larger purpose for attack:	27%	4%
Experiences isolation or hopelessness:	45%	2%
Experiences or perseverates on an injustice or grievance:	61%	15%
Displays hardened, black or white thinking:	41%	12%
Graphic or violent descriptions in writing:	24%	16%
Target detail (person, school, place) in their writing:	42%	63%
Weapon detail (guns, bulletproof vests...) in their writing:	24%	17%
Details about the attack plan, location in their writing:	26%	23%

SIX KEY FINDINGS

- References to 'suicide' and then 'hopelessness and isolation' show a large disparity between active, imminent, substantive attacks (63% and 45%) and trolling, non-imminent, Transient cases (1% and 2%). **When assessing written threat and social media, suicide and feelings of hopelessness and isolation should be seen as a critical aggravating element in the assessment.**
- The target detail element has occurred at a higher rate than expected for non-imminent, trolling, transient or attention seeking cases. We further this was broken down further for non-imminent cases, we found 76% of cases occurred with a fixation (K12, college, Walmart,

hospitals) and 24% of cases occurred with a focus (on specific people or groups of people at a location). **When assessing written threat and social media, specific mentions of people or small groups (focus) should be seen as a more significant aggravating element.**

3. There were large difference in cases that include perseveration on past grievances or injustices and those that contain hardened, either/or thinking between active, imminent, substantive attacks (61% and 41%) and trolling, non-imminent, transient cases (15% and 12%). **When assessing written threat and social media, those who express perseveration on past grievances and injustices in a hardened, passionate and inflexible way should be seen as a more significant aggravating element.**
4. There was a 30% higher difference in those cases that referenced previous shootings between those active, imminent, substantive attacks (43%) and trolling, non-imminent, transient cases (12%). **Mentions of previous attackers should be seen as a significant aggravating element when assessing written threat and social media content.**
5. When assessing mitigating factors, we found 25% (23 out of 93) of the and trolling, non-imminent, transient cases contained a transient, retaliatory expression. Here, the author attempts to save face or gain back lost reputation through eliciting a reaction their readers. Similarly, written content by an author who has a history of sharing written material designed to enflame and enrage others into a reaction occurred in 32% (30 out of 93) of the cases involving non-imminent, transient communications. **When assessing written threat and social media, a tendency towards trolling, being a constant agitator, posting material to save face or draw a reaction from others have a mitigating element to the assessment.**
6. Those with elements of poor thinking, being young, having a developmental mental health disorder, or not understanding the consequences of their actions also show a tendency to occur more in the trolling, non-imminent, transient category with 32% (30 out of 93) of the cases displaying this. **Being young, not thinking through the consequences of actions or having poor critical thinking skills are mitigating elements in the assessment.**

ESCALATING FACTORS

Author Qualities (1-4)

1. **Suicidal content:** This element reflects details in the story, email or social media post that indicate direct or indirect suicidal references. They writer makes direct reference or alludes to dying by their own hand or entering into circumstances where they would be killed. This may be an idea or thought or an actively described plan. Suicidality is present in the vast majority of campus attacks and is a primary risk factor in all existing threat assessment approaches and research (National Threat Assessment Center [NTAC], 2018; Lankford, 2018; 2018 2013; Van Brunt 2015a; 2012; Meloy et al., 2011; Langman 2009; 2015; Newman & Fox, 2009; White & Meloy, 2007; Turner & Gelles, 2003). The element is present in 63% (71) of the 113 cases involving an active attack (Appendix: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 47, 49, 53, 55, 56, 58, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 74, 75, 77, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 101, 103, 107, 108,

2. **Isolation and hopelessness:** The writing sample has elements of isolation, loneliness, and marginalization from the larger societal group. There is an overall quality of sadness and isolation, and a lack of options or any choices that lead to a positive outcome. The author writes in a manner that indicates there is no better way to resolve the conflict or find a way out. This may be stated directly, indirectly hinted at through the writings tone, or as part of the fiction narrative. This isolation and hopelessness for a better future is another central risk factor for targeted violence (NTAC, 2018; Lankford, 2018; 2013; 2013; Van Brunt 2015a; 2012; Meloy et al., 2011; Langman 2009; 2015; Newman & Fox, 2009; White & Meloy, 2007; Turner & Gelles, 2003). The element is present in 45% (55 of the 113) cases that involved an active attack (Appendix: 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 67, 68, 70, 73, 74, 75, 77, 80, 81, 83, 86, 87, 93, 95, 96, 101, 107, 112, 113, 114, 116, 136, 141).
3. **Fame/meaning seeking:** The writing sample or social media post has a tone of seeking larger status as an all-powerful figure, a martyr, or someone who is smarter and more knowledgeable than the rest of the population (Lankford, 2013; 2016; 2018). The author may have “found an answer” that others are too dumb or cowardly to consider and the author or protagonist in the story is forced into a hero’s journey that others are not worthy of following. They may see themselves as a glorified avenger, dark knight or punisher to make things right. They are willing to give their life for the larger glory to find honor and fame in the afterlife or better carry out their overall message. The attacker sees their actions as pure and blessed and their enemies as flawed and corrupt (Moghaddam, 2005). They may have a higher purpose to the attack and message they want to impart. In the cases that involved an active attack, 27% (30 out of 113) had themes of fame seeking or reference a larger purpose/meaning for the attack (Appendix: 7, 12, 20, 36, 43, 44, 47, 56, 57, 61, 67, 70, 85, 87, 88, 91, 94, 95, 96, 107, 109, 114, 115, 128, 134, 135, 136, 138, 140, 143).
4. **Injustice/grievance collecting:** The writing sample contains language about the author’s frustration with past negative treatment, real or perceived. O’Toole described this individual as “a person who feels ‘wronged,’ ‘persecuted’ and ‘destroyed,’ blowing injustices way out of proportion, never forgiving the person they felt has wronged them” (O’Toole & Bowman, 2011, p. 186). They narrow on certain causes, groups or individuals they have been mistreated by in past business relationships, academic progress, social interactions, relationship disappointments or administrative job actions (Calhoun & Weston, 2009; Van Brunt 2015a, 2016). There is an overall tone that some series of past embarrassments or negative interactions have risen to a tipping point where a rant or action is demanded. ASIS International and Society for Human Resource Management published “Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention” (2011), a set of standards for security and human resource personnel to prevent or intervene in potentially dangerous scenarios. This concept is described as, “chronic, unsubstantiated complaints about persecution or injustice; a victim mindset” (p. 22). The element is present in 61% (69 of the 113) cases that involved an active attack (Appendix: 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, 24, 25, 26, 28, 32, 34, 41, 43, 44, 53, 54, 56, 57, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 73, 76, 80, 81, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 100, 108, 111, 112, 114, 135, 138, 143). The vast majority of themes in these cases were to obtain revenge, primarily for past bullying. Other perseverations included academic, anti-government, anti-women, and immigration/race.

Tone Qualities (5-6)

5. **Hardened, black/white thinking:** The writing sample should be explored for the presence of a hardened quality to the writing that reflects an either/or way of thinking (Glasl, 1999; Turner & Gelles, 2003; Van Brunt, 2012; 2015a; 2016). This is viewed in a hardened and inflexible manner where they only see one side of the story. These views are beyond a strongly held belief and contain a passion and emotion that rejects other points of view or hardened ideological positions, and they are reinforced through other personal experiences and networks (Sageman, 2007). In the active attack cases, 41% (46 out of 113) cases had examples of hardened and inflexible thoughts (Appendix: 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 20, 22, 24, 28, 32, 34, 38, 43, 44, 47, 53, 54, 56, 57, 61, 67, 68, 70, 75, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 91, 94, 96, 106, 111, 113, 114, 116, 126, 135, 136, 138, 140, 143, 192).
6. **Graphic and violent descriptions:** The writer uses graphic and shocking language to describe a potential attack or the traits of their targets. This could include vivid adjectives, threatening tones, torture or descriptions of blood and gore (Van Brunt, 2015a; 2015b; 2016). In a 2008 report to the Massachusetts Department of Higher Education by O'Neill, Fox, Depue, and Englander, they write "Writings, drawings, and other forms of individual expression reflecting violent fantasy and causing a faculty member to be fearful or concerned about safety, should be evaluated contextually for any potential threat" (pp. 32–33). This graphic language often gives evidence of fantasy rehearsal that gives rise to moral disengagement. There is little empathy for those outside their specific group (Pressman, 2009). In the cases that involved an active attack, 24% (27 out of 113) used graphic language (Appendix: 10, 13, 15, 16, 20, 28, 44, 46, 51, 71, 76, 80, 81, 86, 87, 90, 91, 93, 96, 107, 114, 116, 134, 136, 138, 143, 161). Examples of this kind of language is highlighted in Table 6.3.

Content Qualities (7-10)

7. **Target detail:** The more detail shared about the specificity of a target, the higher the level of risk. As the author begins to narrow their fixation and focus onto a more specific target, they will often mention this in writing and social media posts (Turner & Gelles, 2003; Van Brunt, 2012). There is often an overall tone in the writing sample that includes negative references to their intelligence, appearance, gender, religion or status. The author may mention a past grievance or wrong that was done to them and identify the person, organization or group that is to be held responsible. In writing samples, emphasis techniques such as the use of capital letters, quotes, references to past attackers and events, color or font changes, parenthetical inserts, underlining or emoji use may occur (Van Brunt, 2015b) Repetition of phrases, further narrowing on an individual or locations schedule, personal or geographic characteristics also demonstrate an increased level of risk. When assessing the written or social media content, the disorganization of the threat or broadness on multiple targets should be seen as a mitigation to the overall risk. There were 42% (47 of the 113) of active attack cases that included details concerning the target (Appendix: 3, 7, 8, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 38, 39, 43, 46, 47, 52, 55, 67, 71, 74, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 90, 92, 93, 100, 107, 108, 114, 115, 116, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 140, 144, 161, 167).
8. **Weapons detail:** There should be an assessment of knowledge and content related to weapons and protective, tactical gear mentioned in the sample. This may include bullet proof vests and high capacity clips. The specific mentioning of these items gives evidence of a more detailed, organized attack plan. Meloy et al. (2011) refers to this as identification warning behavior, "any behavior that indicates a psychological desire to be a 'pseudo-commando'".

Notes

- (Dietz, 1986; Knoll, 2010), have a ‘warrior mentality’ (Hempel et al., 1999), closely associate with weapons or other military or law enforcement paraphernalia, identify with previous attackers or assassins, or identify as an agent to advance a particular cause or belief system” (p. 265). In the active attack cases, 24% (27 out of 113) had examples of weapons detail (Appendix: 15, 20, 35, 36, 44, 47, 52, 70, 71, 77, 80, 81, 83, 86, 87, 100, 107, 114, 115, 126, 130, 134, 135, 140, 143, 144, 161). Examples from these cases are provided in Table 6.4.
- 9. Threat plan detail:** Writing samples and social media posts that have high amount of detail regarding the target, overcoming obstacles, enacting countermeasures, the date or time of the attack and acquiring items such as bolt-cutters or chains. The author may reference schematics, steps to dismantle cameras, combat elbow and knee pads, night-vision goggles, or distraction devices like homemade flashbangs or smoke. These pre-attack planning behaviors are well documented in the threat assessment literature (MSD, 2019; Meloy et al, 2011; Meloy et al, 2014; Van Brunt, 2012; 2015a; 2015b; Deisinger et al, 2008; Deisinger & Scalora, M; 2016). In the active attack cases, 16% (29 out of 113) had content that included planning details for an attack (Appendix: 2, 3, 16, 20, 22, 23, 35, 36, 55, 56, 71, 74, 77, 79, 81, 85, 86, 87, 90, 93, 107, 112, 114, 115, 134, 137, 140, 161, 167).
- 10. Previous attack detail:** The writing sample includes references to previous attacks that occurred. This could also include comments about certain dates (such as Hitler’s birthday 4/20) or other attack details such as ‘chaining the doors’ referencing Virginia Tech’s attacker. They may include studying past attacks or developing plans to kill more people than other attackers. In the cases involving an active attack, 41% (46 out of 113) referenced a previous attack details (Appendix: 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 36, 38, 39, 44, 46, 47, 49, 51, 52, 55, 68, 70, 75, 77, 83, 85, 86, 90, 93, 94, 95, 96, 106, 107, 112, 116, 137, 138, 141, 143, 167). In the active attack cases when past attacks were referenced, 57% of the time it was Columbine, 11% Virginia Tech, and then a mix Oklahoma City, Sandy Hook and others.

MITIGATING ELEMENTS

Author Disposition (1-5)

- 1. Trolling:** The post was made by someone who has a long history of posting or writing material designed to enflame and enrage others. The purpose of the post or writing is to cause distress and to troll others into a reaction. In terms of cases that involved non-imminent attack, 32% (30 out of 93) involved trolling, attention seeking and writing designed to get a reaction from others (Appendix: 64, 98, 99, 117, 119, 121, 124, 125, 127, 131, 139, 145, 150, 154, 157, 158, 160, 170, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 189, 197, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206).
- 2. Developmental delay:** The writing was made by someone developmentally or mentally young, who may have a processing/expressive disorder or was transitioning to a new school or location and the writing or social media post had a juvenile, poorly thought out quality. There is a transitory nature to any threat that might be made. In a review of cases that involved non-imminent attacks, 32% (45 out of 93) had elements of poor thinking, being young, having a developmental mental health disorder, or not understanding the consequences of their actions (Appendix: 27, 30, 45, 48, 50, 72, 78, 82, 84, 102, 117, 118, 121, 122, 123, 131, 132, 139, 142, 149, 153, 154, 157, 158, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 170, 174, 178, 180, 184, 188, 189, 190, 193, 197, 198, 200, 202, 203, 204, 206).
- 3. Tangential, rambling or incoherent:** The writing sample was influence by a serious men-

tal illness that disturbs thought, logic, organization. While there may be concerning material in the writing, the larger context is part of a rambling, inconsistent thought process. There were no cases in the subject pool that matched this type. Many times, these cases are often triaged by mental health admissions or seen as transitory in nature.

4. **International, non-native language:** The author does not have a mastery of the English language and may have made comments that, when taken out of context, sound more substantive in terms of threats. There may be a lack of awareness around cultural norms, sharing of personal information or expectations of privacy. Only one case (Appendix B: 69) matched a student with an ESL background lacking and awareness of cultural norms. This occurred at the University of Central Arkansas in 2011 where a foreign student became upset another student took her orchestra class to move seats. She wrote on Facebook “My current wish is to take gun and shoot all my classmates, enjoying their blood and scary” (Van Brunt, 2015a, p. 6).
5. **Creative author:** The story or social media posts were related to the authors desire to be an author, artist or musician. The content of the writing or social media post, when taken out of an artistic process, looks more concerning. When the larger context is understood (author is creative), it helps move the threat more to a transient state. In a review of cases that involved non-imminent attacks, 4% (4 out of 93) had authors who were connected to artistic expression (Appendix: 27, 31, 45, 82).

Contextual Details (6-10)

6. **Writing for class:** The writing sample or social media post was part of a class or group assignment. When the content is seen from this context, it may still be disturbing, but lessens the level of concern. In a review of cases that involved non-imminent attacks, 4% (4 out of 93) had authors who were connected to artistic expression (Appendix: 27, 45, 63, 82).
7. **Therapeutic journal:** The writing or social media post is part of a larger therapeutic process (either with a professional or alone). The writing is designed to express frustration and allow the author to learn and grow to better handle frustration, impulse control and get a better handle on concerning thoughts. When assessing this content in non-imminent attack cases, 3% (3 out of 93) had writers who wrote their content for a therapeutic journal (Appendix: 56, 63, 163).
8. **Political or opinion piece:** The writing is designed, in a non-violent way, to bring about change through debate and rhetoric. The piece may be satire or the speech common on more extreme radio and talk shows. The larger context of this style of persuasive communication helps mitigate the risk associated with the social media post or writing. When assessing this content in non-imminent attack cases, 9% (8 out of 93) had writers who seemed motivated by rhetoric and harmful debate to troll others (Appendix: 63, 97, 98, 104, 145, 150, 162, 201).
9. **Retaliatory expression:** The writing is designed to create a reaction from the reader or viewer of the social media content. It does not contain ultimatums, but rather is written for the author to save face or gain back lost reputation. This type of communication is described as howling, in chapter one and 5. In a review of cases that involved non-imminent attacks, 25% (23 out of 93) had content made in a retaliatory stance to threaten, save face or hurt others reputation (Appendix: 48, 64, 78, 110, 120, 122, 123, 132, 147, 155, 156, 157, 160, 164, 172, 181, 182, 183, 194, 195, 198, 199, 200).
10. **Affective/reactive:** The writing occurs in reaction to an emotional frustration or event. If

Notes

- threats in the sample, they are vague, disorganized and transient in nature. They are a loud “bark” with very little evidence of bite. This commonly is a social media post following a specific stressor to the person. They are often followed by attempts to take it down or apologize. In a review of non-imminent cases, 16% (15 out of 93) were made in direct reaction to an emotional frustration resulting in a transient, vague or disorganized threat (Appendix: 48, 59, 64, 69, 78, 102, 105, 145, 147, 155, 156, 159, 160, 164, 168).

SCORING GUIDE

A quantitative scoring scheme can be helpful to categorize and prioritize various interventions. The challenge with any scoring guide where numbers are used to represent corresponding risk levels exists in the over-reliance on the numbers, over-emphasis on cut-off scores and the use of the tool to take punitive action, rather than develop a tailored, advocacy based intervention approach such as those outlined in Hart’s work in Structured Professional Judgement and the HCR-20 (Hart & Logan, 2011; Douglas et al, 2014).

For Looking Glass scoring, elements should be scored 0 if the item is not present in the writing sample or social media post and 2 if it is clearly present. Scores of 1 are given if the element is vague or poorly defined. The use of examples for each item are provided in Appendix K. The overall score can then be used to make a decision about requiring a mandated violence risk or threat assessment and put interventions into place.

The Looking Glass score is then obtained by subtracting the mitigating elements from the escalating elements. This provides a range from -20 to +20. Future discussion and research related to interventions based on the scoring would need to be explored. Overall, scores of -20 would indicate an ideal where there are no escalating elements and all the protective elements. Scores of +20 would indicate a perfect negative score, with all of the escalating elements and none of the protective ones. As an expert system, Looking Glass should be used in combination with other assessment tools, such as the NaBITA Risk Rubric for initial triage, and threat assessment tools such as the SIVRA-35, HCR-20, WAVR-21 or ATAP’s RAGE-V.

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Terminology

Risk Factors

Many researchers have discussed the various risk factors related to targeted violence. These have included the Federal Bureau of Investigations¹, National Center for Threat Assessment², The U.S. Post Office³, National Behavioral Intervention Team Association⁴, and the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals⁵. Some of these are listed here below:

Direct threat	Indirect threat	Lack mental support	End of a relationship
Access to weapons	Lack of peer support	Explosive reactions	Inability to date
Hardened thoughts	Lack of family support	Intimidates others	Hopelessness
Social isolation	Loss of job	Lacks empathy	Last act behavior
Victim of bullying	Decline in academics	Polarized thoughts	Legacy token
Substance abuse	Acquiring weapons	Glorifies violence	Feeling persecuted
Authority conflict	Suicide attempt	Lacking remorse	Leaking attack plan
Fixation on target	Focus on target	Action plan for attack	Timeframe for attack
Fantasy rehearsal	Rejection	Financial loss	Catalyst event
Feeling trapped	Poor anger outlets	Fame seeking	Objectification/ Depersonalization

A key aspect of understanding risk factors is the importance of seeing these in combination, like puzzle pieces coming together to create a larger meaning. As with a puzzle, one piece alone is not particularly useful. It's when these pieces combine that the factors begin to be more useful in understanding risk.

Protective Factors

When conducting a threat assessment, it is essential to balance risk factors against the protective factors that exist for an individual. These protective factors often “take the temperature down” regarding the concerns⁶. Some of these factors are included below:

Social support	Empathy to others	School engagement	Religious supports
Family support	Perspective taking	Work engagement	Non-violent outlets
Positive future view	Intimate relationship	Positive self-esteem	Problem solving
No weapon access	Sense of identity	Consequence aware	Emotional stability
Social/political safety	Housing stability	Resiliency	Lacks reactivity

Leakage

Leakage is the communication to a third party of intent to do harm⁷. BIT team members have opportunities to detect leakage concerning a potential attack during an initial interview. Team members should be aware that violence is rarely spontaneous. Those who act violently take time to rehearse and fantasize about violent acts. This presents an opportunity for others to overhear or observe potential leakage that could then be used to prevent an attack. The presence of this kind of leakage prior to an attack gives evidence to support the idea that those who plan this kind of mass casualty violence often plan, fantasize, and talk about the

Silo(ing)

Siloing occurs when departments or individuals hold onto information in isolation, without working collaboratively. These isolated communications occur when each department focuses on their own individual mission, policy, and rules without seeing themselves as part of a larger, more complex system. Communications that focus primarily on a single department to the detriment of seeing threat assessment and behavioral intervention as larger, community-based approaches are said to be operating in a “silo.” Much like the tall grain silos that are spotted throughout the Midwest, they are single structures serving their function, separated from the larger overall system. Researchers further define this danger: “there is always the risk of a ‘silo effect’ — different domains of behavior are never linked together or synthesized to develop a comprehensive picture of the subject of concern, conduct further investigation, identify other warning behaviors, and actively risk-manage the case.”⁹

Catalyst Event

A catalyst event is an event in the subject’s life that involves a sense of stark change. Some examples would include the death of a parent, the loss of a job, chronic illness, losing a position in an academic program, not making the cut for a sports team, suspension or expulsion from school, failing a pledge to a fraternity or sorority, police charges, or loss of an intimate relationship. The danger here is the idea that the catalyst event becomes the match to a pool of gasoline, accelerating the movement towards violence.¹⁰

Legacy Token

Legacy tokens are writings or media content prepared by a perpetrator prior to an attack that are typically designed to be found following the attack as a way to share a message. The legacy token is a manifesto, written text, online blog, video project, piece of art, diary, or journal created prior to an attack and left for someone to find after the attack. It clarifies the motives of the attacker or better defines the attacker’s message of infamy. A legacy token merits study by those involved in violence prevention because it can help them be better prepared to engage others who intend to harm.¹¹

Costuming

Costuming is the process of creating a persona or mask that defines or hides the true identity of those planning violence. There are two explanations for the type of clothing and accessories mass shooters choose. First, this is an individual who is dressing tactically to complete a mission. Few retailers sell tactical vests, knee pads, thigh rigs, and harnesses offer colors in red, pink, or yellow. Choices are more typically black, olive drab, and camouflage. Colors and styles are designed to allow wearers to have easy access to their weapons, as well as to blend into surroundings. Shooters choose these items for similar reasons. The second reason shooters outfit themselves in this style of tactical gear is more psychological in nature. Meloy refers to this as identification warning behavior. “Identification warning behavior is any behavior that indicates a psychological desire to be a ‘pseudo-commando’ have a ‘warrior mentality’¹², closely associate with weapons or other military or law enforcement paraphernalia, identify with previous attackers or assassins, or identify oneself as an agent to advance a particular cause or belief system.”¹³

Zero-Tolerance Policies

These zero-tolerance policies refer to a straightforward separation based on a single incident of weapons possession or violent threat/rhetoric. Simply separating a subject from school or work under the authority of a zero-tolerance policy creates the potential to take an upset, frustrated individual and escalate them into a rage-filled and potentially vengeful attacker. Careful assessment, intervention, and monitoring are the tools that are most effective in mitigating threats of violence in the community. While separating

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a subject from campus or work may give an illusion of safety, there are numerous examples where angry, disgruntled, and disempowered individuals came back to campus or the workplace to seek their revenge. O'Toole writes, "In a knee-jerk reaction, communities may resort to inflexible, one-size-fits-all policies on preventing or reacting to violence."¹⁴ The FBI writes, "Do not rely on expulsion, except as a last resort and unless absolutely necessary to ensure campus safety; authorities should avoid the temptation to simply expel students of concern to quickly resolve a risk. Isolated from other contingency and safety planning, this strategy sometimes can worsen matters. The final humiliation of expulsion may serve as a precipitating, or triggering, stressor in the subject's life and propel the marginalized and hostile individual toward violence."¹⁵

Hardening the Target

Target hardening is the process of making a target more difficult to attack. This occurs when buildings create a single point of entrance, use closed circuit television cameras (CCTV), build reinforced doors, install automatic locks, create sign in/sign out policies, or have armed School Resources Officers (SROs). Many attackers have shown in their journals that they are specifically considering these factors when carrying out an attack. This was evidenced in James Holmes' journal at the Colorado movie theatre attack and then more recently in the El Paso shooters manifesto, which stated: "Attack low security targets. Even though you might out gun a security guard or police man, they likely beat you in armor, training, and numbers. Do not throw away your life on an unnecessarily dangerous target. If a target seems too hot, live to fight another day."

Objectification and Depersonalization

Distancing oneself from a target is a common technique used to avoid any lasting emotional connection that might distract from completing the mission at hand. Objectification and depersonalization are risk factors, as they allow the aggressor to dehumanize the intended victims. The seeing of another as separate from oneself is one of the building blocks necessary prior to carrying out a rampage shooting or other extreme violent event.

Weapons

The following is a short list of some common weapons. Familiarizing yourself with these would allow you to better understand weapons commonly used in attacks. This is not a definitive list, but rather a starting place for those without firearm experience.¹⁷

- ▶ **Glock handgun.** This weapon is commonly seen as a streamlined and modern handgun capable of holding 17 bullets in a standard sized magazine. The gun can have different calibers, such as 9mm, 10mm, .40 caliber, and .45 caliber. Generally speaking, the 9mm caliber is the smallest and cheapest to purchase. This handgun is commonly used at the shooting range and are easy to maintain.
- ▶ **Sig Sauer.** A German-made handgun known for its efficient design.
- ▶ **Smith & Wesson.** This weapon is most commonly a revolver known for its reliability and American-made status.
- ▶ **Colt Python.** A popular revolver in the *Resident Evil* video game series and the *Walking Dead* TV series. While it only holds six bullets, it is valued for its accuracy and stopping power.
- ▶ **Desert Eagle.** An Israeli-made handgun that is available in a .50-caliber round. This gun was made popular because of the enormous kick it gives when fired. The gun is also popular in the *Call of Duty* video game series.
- ▶ **FN P90.** This is a bull-pup style carbine that fires expensive ammunition. It was made popular in the movie *StarGate* and the *Call of Duty* video game series. The rifle is very

recognizable due to its compact size and high magazine capacity of 50 rounds laid out across the top of the rifle. The FN pistol uses the same ammunition and was the weapon of choice by Major Hasan, the psychiatrist who killed 13 and injured 29 in the 2009 Fort Hood shooting.

- ▶ **AR-15.** A rifle made popular following several of the recent large school and movie theatre shootings— at Newtown, Connecticut by Adam Lanza, and James Holmes at the Aurora, Colorado movie theatre. It is often the subject of debate between gun enthusiasts and those looking to reduce access to firearms in the United States.
- ▶ **Crossbow.** This weapon has been made more popular following the TV series *The Walking Dead* by one of the lead characters, Darryl. It is also featured on many of the *Call of Duty* video games and is seen as a more elegant way to kill opponents with skill rather than the power of traditional weapon.
- ▶ **E0tech.** This company manufactures a high-quality set of optics and holographic weapon sites that are used in many popular TV shows, movies, and video games.
- ▶ **Hollow-Point Bullets.** These used to be known as “cop-killers” because of their wound pattern and tendency to break up into smaller projectiles upon impact.
- ▶ **Airsoft.** Hobbyists who play intricate military games use these toy guns frequently. The guns are popular with teenagers and young adults.

Explosives

The following is a list of common concepts and terminology that are useful for BIT team members to have an awareness of when interviewing a subject. This is not meant to be a comprehensive list and certainly does not reflect any expertise in chemistry or explosives.

- ▶ **C4.** This is a military-grade plastic explosive used for its relative stability. Frequent media references to this make it a commonly-known explosive, even though its availability is highly restricted.
- ▶ **Radio Controlled “RC” Car.** Related to C4 and made popular in the *Call of Duty* video game, where radio control cars are strapped with C4 explosive and a video camera. They are available to the player to drive around and “explode” when triggered.
- ▶ **The Anarchist Cookbook.** Popular in the 1970s, the cookbook contains information about how to make bombs, illegal drugs, and ways to subvert the phone company. Made available on the Internet, it has been downloaded and studied by several involved in bombing attacks and school assaults.
- ▶ **Pressure Cooker Bomb.** This is a method of creating an explosive device using a pressure cooker, shrapnel, and an explosive charge. It’s a low-tech, low-cost method of creating an explosive device, and was made popular by the April 2013 Boston bombing.
- ▶ **Dirty Bomb.** This is a bomb made with some kind of radioactive material designed to contaminate a larger area. The concept was made popular by many TV shows, movies, and video games.
- ▶ **Pipe Bomb.** This is a small, contained explosive made out of a plumbing or PVC pipe. Similar to a pressure cooker bomb, basic materials may be found at hardware stores and fireworks outlets.
- ▶ **Little Cricket.** These bombs were used during the Columbine attack and are made from CO2 cartridges, explosives, and fuses. They may be mentioned by those who study past attacks and seek to copy-cat previous assaults.

Affective & Predatory Violence

There are two different primary types of violence that BIT team members will encounter: affective and predatory violence. Meloy writes, "It is generally agreed that violence is either affective or predatory. Affective violence, sometimes referred to as reactive, impulsive, or emotional violence, is preceded by autonomic arousal, caused by a reaction to a perceived threat, and accompanied by intense feelings of anger and/or fear. It is a defensive violence, and its evolutionary basis is self-protection to live another day... Predatory violence, sometimes referred to as instrumental or premeditated violence, is characterized by the absence of autonomic arousal and emotion, the absence of an imminent threat, and planning and preparation beforehand. It is offensive violence, and its evolutionary basis is hunting for food to live another day."¹⁸ The difference is described below.

Affective Violence

Affective violence is the result of a progressive, biologically driven path towards physical violence. It is poorly planned and a reaction to environmental stressors. Affective violence is based upon the primal instinct of fight or flight, fueled by adrenaline and characterized by someone losing control and ultimately attacking a victim. Howard describes it this way: "A potential aggressor channels his appraisal into some form of coping. The strength of the reaction is a direct function of the validation of the threat and the degree of certainty that the threat will thwart an objective or a goal. It is the emotion of being threatened and the inability to cope with that threat that initiates aggression. The common thread throughout this process is the release of adrenaline."¹⁹

Grossman and Siddle have conducted landmark studies looking into how aggression can induce adrenaline's (or epinephrine's) influence on the heart rate, body language, behavior, and communication.²⁰ The adrenaline rushing through a subject's system has also been well studied by Hart²¹. He illustrates that when an individual cannot cope with their anxiety, their mind perceives this anxiety as a threat. As the individual starts to produce adrenaline, this triggers the affective violence response.²²

Predatory Violence

Predatory violence, in its extreme form, is described as an intent-driven, planned attack. This aggression occurs when a subject becomes isolated, disconnected, lacks trust, and often feels threatened and frustrated by a perceived attack. They plot and plan their revenge and execute their plans with a militaristic, tactical precision.²³ This violence is a result of a planned, intent-driven action that is more commonly exhibited by a subject engaging in mission-oriented, instrumental violence such as a mass shooting.²⁴ Predatory violence involves a more strategic, focused attack and a desire to complete a mission.

The NaBITA Model of Predatory Violence

The NaBITA approach shows this type of aggression moving through four stages: empowering thoughts, escalating behaviors, elaboration of threat, and the emergence of violence.²⁵

1. **Empowering Thoughts:** The individual feels a strong passion about a particular belief, while filtering out information that doesn't line up with their beliefs. Common examples include religion, politics, academic expectations, social justice, or relationships. There are no threats or

specific targeted individuals identified at this phase. These beliefs may be demonstrated by social media posts or wearing inflammatory articles of clothing.

2. **Escalating Behaviors:** The individual at this level begins to argue and confront others around them in harmful debate with an intent to polarize. Here, being right supersedes the facts, and they seek to impose their beliefs on others or encourage common cause. They frequently engage in confrontations with others as a result. The individual finds their previous arguments and discussions unsatisfactory and begins to storm off or become aggressive when challenged. This leads to an increase in non-verbal behaviors, which communicate their frustration and anger. There is a move away from debate and dialogue and a move toward further objectification and depersonalization. This may include the use of signs and posters, social media posts, and passive-aggressive behavior.
3. **Elaboration of Threat:** Here, there is a crystallizing of a target and a fixation and focus on an individual, group, department, or organization. They find others who support their beliefs by joining groups or clubs, organizations, teams, reading books, or accessing online resources. They seek to confirm their ideas and find ways to intimidate and confront others beyond verbal arguments. There is a shaming or embarrassing of the target and a desire to unmask them in the community. There is further objectifying and depersonalizing of the target's feelings, thoughts, and actions. They may challenge the target with a "do this or else" conditional ultimatum. There may be a threat of punishment if the target does not comply with the threats and demands. Threats are infused with credibility, but there is rarely physical violence at this stage, and only an increase in threatening language or leakage of plan details.
4. **Emergence of Violence:** The early stage of this phase can involve test runs at carrying out the attack plan on the target or a substitute target. These may include destroying the target's possessions, invasive monitoring of their family, friends, or social circle, or gathering information to better harm the target. Intentional leakage is rarer at this stage than in Level 3 (Elaboration of Threat) but may occur inadvertently, as the preparation behavior for the final step on the pathway to violence is observed by others despite efforts to keep it covert. As the planning moves forward, the attacker increasingly uses militaristic and tactical language, developing strategies to carry out their plan. They are often full of hopelessness, desperation, and suicidal thoughts, and have a sense of inevitability related to their attack plan. Detaching from meaningful relationships, giving away prized possessions, extremely flat affect, or warning some people away from the target are abstracted forms of leakage that may characterize this stage. They justify their violence based on their hardened perspective.

The Meloy Model of Predatory Violence

Meloy defines these stages through these approach behaviors. These are: fixation, identification, novel aggression, energy burst, leakage, last resort, and directly communicated threat.²⁶

1. **Fixation Warning Behavior** – any behavior that indicates an increasingly pathological preoccupation with a person or a cause. It is measured by:
 - ▶ increasing perseveration on the person or cause;
 - ▶ increasingly strident opinion;
 - ▶ increasingly negative characterization of the object of fixation;
 - ▶ impact on the family or other associates of the object of fixation, if present and aware; and/or
 - ▶ angry emotional undertone.
 It is typically accompanied by social or occupational deterioration.

2. **Identification Warning Behavior** – any behavior that indicates a psychological desire to be a “pseudo-commando,” have a “warrior mentality,” closely associate with weapons or other military or law enforcement paraphernalia, identify with previous attackers or assassins, or identify oneself as an agent to advance a particular cause or belief system.
3. **Novel Aggression Warning Behavior** – an act of violence that appears unrelated to any targeted violence pathway warning behavior committed for the first time. Such behaviors may be used to test the ability of the subject to actually do a violent act, and may be a measure of response tendency, the motivation to act on the environment, or a behavioral tryout.
4. **Energy Burst Warning Behavior** – an increase in the frequency or variety of any noted activities related to the target, even if the activities themselves are relatively innocuous, usually in the days or weeks before the attack.
5. **Leakage Warning Behavior** – the communication to a third party of an intent to do harm to a target through an attack.
6. **Last Resort Warning Behavior** – evidence of a violent “action imperative,” increasing desperation or distress through declaration in word or deed, forcing the individual into a position of last resort. There is no alternative other than violence, and the consequences are justified.
7. **Directly Communicated Threat Warning Behavior** – the communication of a direct threat to the target or law enforcement beforehand. A threat is a written or oral communication that implicitly or explicitly states a wish or intent to damage, injure, or kill the target, or individuals symbolically or actually associated with the target.

Structured Professional Judgment

Hart, a proponent of using structured professional judgment and co-author of the HCR-20, a violence risk assessment tool, offers an outline to understand the process of threat assessment focused on the needs of the individual, case management, and a detailed discussion of clinical formulation.²⁷ Hart’s work moves away from prediction models and instead illustrates the potential exacerbating factors that could cause violence, as well as those inhibiting factors that reduce violence risk. The structured professional judgment process can be outlined in seven steps: gather information, determine the presence of risk factors, determine the relevance of risk factors, develop a good formulation of violence risk, develop scenarios of violence, develop a case management plan based on those scenarios, and develop conclusory opinions about violence risk. For a more detailed look at SPJ, chapter three in *Harm to Others* walks readers through the process.²⁸

Hunters and Howlers

Calhoun and Weston (2009) wrote a seminal book on threat assessment called *Threat Assessment and Management Strategies: Identifying the Howlers and Hunters*.²⁹ Their central premise is that those who plan to attack don't always communicate this in advance. They write: "Threat management involves managing two very different types of individuals. One group consists of hunters. They truly intend to use lethal violence to aggrieve some perceived injustice. Hunters develop a reason for committing violence, come up with the idea to do so, research and plan their attack, prepare for it, then breach their target's security and actually attack. Whatever their reason, those who intend to act violently go through the process of intended violence."

Most direct communicated threats do not lead to violence. Calhoun and Weston make this point: "Writing letters is easy; shooting someone or setting him on fire presents a considerably more difficult challenge." While this is accurate, it remains important to explore the contextual risk factors related to the specific case at hand. The challenge is to determine whether a violent or threatening behavior is simply a bad decision on the part of the subject, or if the threat of violence is the proverbial "tip of the iceberg," exposing deeper plans that may lead to a more dangerous event occurring in the future.

Although direct threats often do not lead to violence, there must be a diligence in the assessment process. The FBI explains it this way: "Unlike disruptive and other forms of aggressive behavior, violent or directly communicated threat always requires immediate investigation and evaluation... While most communicated direct threats do not end in violence, this can only be determined after directly questioning and assessing the student in question."³⁰

Understanding & Mitigating Bias

Bias is our tendency to see the world from our particular lens of experience. It can lead us to ignore the evidence or make assumptions not based on evidence. It can impact what we remember and what witnesses remember. It can create blinders for BIT team members and impact their ability to build rapport, connect, and create safe/neutral spaces. While we can never remove bias, we can train to make us more aware of how bias can affect decision making.

What is Bias?

- ▶ A preference or tendency to like or dislike; a cognitive process
- ▶ A habit learned over time through repeated personal experience
- ▶ Implicit or expressed
- ▶ Can be intentional, but generally unintentional
- ▶ Formed from stereotypes, societal norms, cultural experiences, and expectations of the people around you

Type of Bias

- ▶ **Confirmation Bias:** Form an early hypothesis and tend to seek or overvalue evidence that fits it or confirms it. Are you interviewing or validating?
- ▶ **Experience Bias:** The tendency to see the world from your own experience.
- ▶ **Responsibility Bias:** The tendency to assume people should be responsible for themselves.
- ▶ **In Group/Out Group:** The tendency to be favorable toward the group that is similar to you.
- ▶ **Blind Spot:** Ability to spot systematic errors in others' decisions.
- ▶ **Availability Bias:** Reliance upon readily available (most recent) information.

Where does bias come from?

- ▶ Gender, gender identity experiences, and sexual orientation
- ▶ Race/ethnicity, world view, and generational expectations
- ▶ Mental illness or physical disabilities
- ▶ Different cultures or geographic areas
- ▶ Veteran history; and religious or political experiences
- ▶ Economic differences; and friend or peer groups

Threat & Violence Risk Assessment Tools

NaBITA: Risk Rubric

The NaBITA Risk Rubric is designed to be the initial assessment applied to every case a threat or BIT/CARE team comes across. Following this triage assessment, teams should deploy additional assessments and gather additional data to most effectively assess risk. The NaBITA Risk Rubric gives teams a framework for understanding the risk present in a case and offers possible interventions to reduce the risk. The Risk Rubric is made up of two scales:

1. **The D-Scale:** This scale assesses issues of life stress and emotional health through a series of four progressive levels: 1) Developing, 2) Declining, 3) Deteriorating, and 4) Decompensating. As the levels increase, there are more concerning and serious emotional and behavioral health-related risks, including the potential for affective violence and aggression. The trajectory of this scale is more likely to result in self-harm than in harm to others.
2. **The E-Scale:** This scale assesses issues of hostility and violence to others through a series of four progressive levels: 1) Empowering Thoughts, 2) Escalating Behaviors, 3) Elaboration of Threat, and 4) Emergence of Violence. The levels increase to address more concerning risk factors for targeted/instrumental violence, hostility, and threats to others. The trajectory of this scale is more likely to result in harm to others than in harm to self, though both risks are present.

Once the overall risk rating of Mild, Moderate, Elevated or Critical is made, the BIT/CARE or threat team moves to develop interventions. The NaBITA Risk Rubric offers a range of risk-based actions that the team should consider. These interventions are based on the level of risk determined in the Overall Summary (Mild, Moderate, Elevated, and Critical), and they are supported by a decade of successful interventions by teams that have followed their roadmap. For an online version of the Risk Rubric, or to access supporting articles, training opportunities and a colorful tri-fold version of the tool, visit www.nabita.org/tools.

NaBITA: Violence Risk Assessment of the Written Word (VRAW²)

The VRAW² was created in 2015 following increasing numbers of cases in which subjects shared concerning written communication through social media, creative writing classes, and over email. The VRAW² offers five factors (Fixation and Focus, Hierarchical Thematic Content, Action and Time Imperative, Pre-Attack Planning, and Injustice Collecting) that are then scored to provide a Mild, Moderate, Elevated, or Critical Level of risk, in line with NaBITA Risk Rubric. The VRAW² has aided teams in focusing more objectively on the literature related to threat assessment when assessing threatening or concerning writing. The VRAW² provides teams with better footing when making decisions about intervention related to written concerns. For an online version of the Risk Rubric, or to access supporting articles and training opportunities, visit www.nabita.org/tools.

NaBITA: Structured Interview of Violence Risk Assessment (SIVRA-35)

The SIVRA-35 was created in 2012 as an expert system. It is a structured set of items to use with individuals who may pose a threat to the community. The SIVRA-35 is a guided structured interview useful for classifying risk into Low, Moderate, and High categories based on concepts from existing threat and violence risk assessment literature. The SIVRA-35 was designed to address targeted and strategic violence on college campuses, such as the Virginia Tech massacre and the shootings at Northern Illinois University, Umpqua College, and Santa Monica College, and by enrolled or recently

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enrolled college students at non-campus locations, such as James Holmes and Jared Loughner. For a foundational online version of the SIVRA-35, or to access supporting articles and training opportunities, visit www.nabita.org/tools.

NaBITA: Extremist Risk Intervention Scale (ERIS)

BIT/CARE and Threat Assessment Teams have, with good reason, become increasingly concerned with how to identify the potential for radicalization of students, faculty, and staff. Radicalism and extremism should be viewed on a continuum, from critical or counter-culture thinking to seeing violence as a reasonable pathway to bring about a desired change. The Radicalization Risk Rubric seeks to provide teams with an understanding of what to look for to identify and intervene with at-risk individuals who have radical thoughts and behaviors that are escalating to extremist violence and terrorism. For an online version of the ERIS, or to access supporting articles and training opportunities, visit www.nabita.org/tools.

Historical Clinical Risk Management-20 (HCR-20)

The HCR-20, which is in its third version, is a structured professional judgment instrument used to assess risk and develop mitigation plans. The measure is well researched and evidence-based. The authors of the measure explain that risk and threat are always incompletely understood due to the uncertainty inherent in individuals' choices. The HCR-20 is commonly used in psychiatric settings to determine release criteria, admission screenings, and inpatient psychiatric management, as well as to monitor risk in probation and parole settings. The HCR-20 is a process rather than a singular tool producing a quantitative score or measure. The seven-stage process includes: 1) gathering information, 2) identifying the presence of risk factors, 3) determining the relevance of the risk factors, 4) formulation of the motivators for violence, 5) the development of risk scenarios, 6) management, and 7) final opinions. For more information about the HCR-20, visit <http://hcr-20.com>.

Workplace Assessment of Violence Risk-21 (WAVR-21)

The WAVR-21 is a workplace violence risk assessment designed to assist human resource and threat assessment professionals to work through a structured set of dynamic and static risk factors to better estimate the likelihood of violence by an employee. Though designed with a workplace setting in mind, the WAVR-21 offers some guidance to those working in a higher education environment when it comes to identifying potential risks with students, faculty, and staff. For more information about the WAVR-21 visit www.wavr21.com.

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WAVR-21 (White & Meloy): <http://wavr21.com>

HCR-20 (Hart): http://proactive-resolutions.com/old-site/bookletsmanuals/hcr-20-ver2_eu.html

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SIVRA-35 (Van Brunt): www.nabita.org/resources/assessment-tools/sivra-35/

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Appendix:

Case Review of Attacks and Social Media Treats

1. 08/01/1966: University of Texas Tower Shooting, Austin, Texas
2. 12/30/1974: Olean High School Shooting, Olean, New York
3. 05/28/1975: Brampton Centennial Shooting, Brampton, Ontario, Canada
4. 05/20/1988: Hubbard Woods Elementary School Shooting, Winnetka, Illinois
5. 09/14/89: Standard Gravure Shooting, Louisville, Kentucky
6. 09/18/89: Jackson County High School, McKee, Kentucky
7. 12/06/89: École Polytechnique Massacre, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
8. 11/01/91: University of Iowa Shooting, Iowa City, Iowa
9. 08/24/92: University Shooting, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
10. 01/18/93: East Carter High School Shooting, Grayson, Kentucky
11. 03/25/94: Etowah High School Shooting, Woodstock, Georgia
12. 04/19/95: Oklahoma City Bombing, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
13. 02/02/96: Frontier Middle School Shooting, Moses Lake, Washington
14. 03/13/96: Dunblane Massacre, Dunblane, Scotland
15. 02/19/97: Bethel Regional Shooting, Bethel, Alaska
16. 10/01/97: Pearl High School Shooting, Pearl, Mississippi
17. 12/01/97: Heath High School Shooting, West Paducah, Kentucky
18. 04/24/98: Parker Middle School Dance Shooting, Edinboro, Pennsylvania
19. 05/20-21/98: Thurston High School Shooting, Springfield, Oregon
20. 04/20/99: Columbine Shooting, Littleton, Colorado
21. 07/27-29/99: Atlanta Day Trading Shootings, Atlanta, Georgia
22. 01/30/01: De Anza College Thwarted Attack, Cupertino, California
23. 03/05/01: Santana High School Shooting, Santee, California
24. 10/28/02: Arizona Nursing College Shooting, Tucson, Arizona
25. 05/09/03: Case Western Reserve University Shooting, Cleveland, Ohio
26. 09/24/03: Rocori High School Shooting, Cold Spring, Minnesota
27. 10/03: H.B. Thompson Middle School Horror Movie, Syosset, New York
28. 02/09/04: Columbia High School Shooting, East Greenbush, New York
29. 03/16/04: Malcolm High School Thwarted Attack, Malcolm, Nebraska
30. 02/04: St. Paul Harding High School Threat, St. Paul, Minnesota
31. 10/14/04: Humbolt High School Poetry, St. Paul, Minnesota
32. 03/21/05: Red Lake Reservation High School Shooting, Red Lake, Minnesota
33. 11/08/05: Campbell County High School Shooting, Jacksboro, Tennessee
34. 01/30/06: Goleta Postal Service Shootings, Goleta, California
35. 04/23/06: Puyallup Threat, Puyallup, Washington
36. 08/30/06: Orange High School Patricide Attack, Hillsborough, North Carolina
37. 09/02/06: Shepherd University Shootings, Shepherdstown, West Virginia
38. 09/13/06: Dawson College Shooting, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
39. 09/14/06: Bay East High School Threat, Green Bay, Wisconsin

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40. 09/27/06: Platte Canyon School Hostage Crisis, Bailey, Colorado
41. 09/29/06: Weston High School Shooting, Cazenovia, Wisconsin
42. 10/02/06: Amish Schoolhouse Shooting, Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania
43. 11/20/06: Emsdetten School Shooting, North Rhine, Germany
44. 04/16/07: Virginia Tech Shooting, Blacksburg, Virginia
45. 04/23/07: Cary-Grove High School Essay, Cary, Illinois
46. 10/10/07: Plymouth Whitemarsh Thwarting, Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania
47. 11/07/07: Jokela School Shooting, Jokela, Tuusula, Finland
48. 12/07: University of Arkansas Threat, Fayetteville, Arkansas
49. 02/14/08: Northern Illinois Shooting, DeKalb, Illinois
50. 06/04/08: Penn High School Thwarted Attack, South Bend, Indiana
51. 09/23/08: Kauhajoki School Shooting, Kauhajoki, Western Finland, Finland
52. 03/17/09: Attleborough Academy Threat, Norfolk, England
53. 04/03/09: American Civic Association Immigration Center, Binghamton, New York
54. 04/10/09: Henry Ford Community College Shooting, Dearborn, Michigan
55. 05/18/09: Larose Cut Off Middle School Attack, Larose, Louisiana
56. 08/04/09: LA Fitness/Collier Shooting, Collier, Pennsylvania
57. 11/05/09: Fort Hood Shooting, Killeen, Texas
58. 11/17/09: Beauvais Thwarted Attack, Beauvais, France
59. 12/09: Mortuary Trocar Threat, Minneapolis, Minnesota
60. 02/12/10: University of Alabama Shooting, Huntsville, Alabama
61. 02/18/10: Austin IRS Plane Attack, Austin, Texas
62. 02/23/10: Deer Creek Middle School Shooting, Littleton, Colorado
63. 10/26/10: Combat Vet Essay, Baltimore, Maryland
64. 12/10/10: Elonis v. U.S., Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
65. 12/14/10: School Board Shooting, Panama City, Florida
66. 01/05/11: Millard High School Shooting, Omaha, Nebraska
67. 01/08/11: Tucson Shooting, Tucson, Arizona
68. 04/07/11: Rio de Janeiro Shooting, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
69. 04/29/11: University of Central Arkansas, Conway, Arkansas
70. 07/22/11: Norway Attacks, Oslo and Utoya Island, Norway
71. 08/17/11: Freedom High Thwarted Attack, Tampa, Florida
72. 01/29/12: UMass, Tyler Molander Letter, Amherst, Massachusetts
73. 02/27/12: Chardon High School Shooting, Chardon, Ohio
74. 07/20/12: Aurora Theater Shooting, Aurora, Colorado
75. 12/14/12: Sandy Hook Shooting, Newtown, Connecticut
76. 01/10/13: Taft Union High School Shooting, Kern, California
77. 05/27/13: West Albany Bomb Plot, Albany, Oregon
78. 06/27/13: League of Legends Threat, San Antonio, Texas
79. 07/03/13: University of Washington Thwarted Attack, Seattle, Washington
80. 10/21/13: Sparks Middle School Shooting, Sparks, Nevada
81. 12/13/13: Arapahoe High School Shooting, Centennial, Colorado
82. 01/28/14: Verona Area High School Threat, Verona, Wisconsin
83. 03/14: Loughborough Attempted Attack, Leicestershire, England
84. 03/04/14: Columbine Obsession, Danbury High School, Danbury, Connecticut
85. 04/09/14: Franklin Regional High School Stabbing, Murrysville, Pennsylvania
86. 04/29/14: Waseca High School Shooting Plot, Waseca, Minnesota

87. 05/23/14: Isla Vista Killings, Isla Vista, California
88. 05/31/14: Slender Man Attack, Waukesha, Wisconsin
89. 05/31/14: FSU Strozier Library Shooting, Tallahassee, Florida
90. 06/05/14: Seattle Pacific University Shooting, Seattle, Washington
91. 06/08/14: Las Vegas Walmart Shootings, Las Vegas, Nevada
92. 10/24/14: Marysville Pilchuck High School Shooting, Marysville, Washington
93. 11/03/14: Newcastle College Plot, Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom
94. 06/17/15: Charleston Church Shooting, Charleston, South Carolina
95. 08/26/15: Live TV Shooting, Roanoke, Virginia
96. 10/01/15: Umpqua Community College, Roseburg, Oregon
97. 10/02/15: 4chan Threat, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
98. 11/17/15: Kean University Twitter Threats, Union, New Jersey
99. 01/04/16: Columbia South Carolina Bomb Threats, Columbia, South Carolina
100. 02/12/16: Independence High School Murder Suicide, Glendale, Arizona
101. 02/29/16: Madison Junior-Senior High School, Middletown, Ohio
102. 09/22/16: Fargo South High Threat, Fargo, North Dakota
103. 01/01/17: West Liberty-Salem High School Attack, Salem, Ohio
104. 03/13/17: Greenwood County Facebook Threat, Greenwood County, South Carolina
105. 03/15/17: Ware Shoals Threat, Greenwood County, South Carolina
106. 05/26/17: Portland Train Attack, Portland, Oregon
107. 06/08/17: Weis Market Attack, Eaton Township, Pennsylvania
108. 09/13/17: Freeman High School Shooting, Rockford, Washington
109. 10/01/17: Las Vegas Music Festival Shooting, Las Vegas, Nevada
110. 10/03/17: San Antonio Strip Threat, San Antonio, Texas
111. 11/05/17: Sutherland Texas Shooting, Sutherland Springs, Texas
112. 12/07/17: Aztec High School, Aztec, New Mexico
113. 01/23/18: Marshall County High School Shooting, Benton, Kentucky
114. 02/14/18: Stoneman Douglas High School Shooting, Parkland, Florida
115. 02/14/18: ACES Alternative High School Plot, Everett, Washington
116. 02/15/18: Fair Haven School Shooting Threat, Fair Haven, Vermont
117. 02/15/18: Broome High Snapchat Threat, Spartanburg, South Carolina
118. 02/15/18: Belton-Honea Path Threat, Honea Path, South Carolina
119. 02/16/18: Abbeville High Bomb Threat, Abbeville, South Carolina
120. 02/18/18: Jessamine County Snapchat Threat, Nicholasville, Kentucky
121. 02/18/18: Broome High Copycat Threat, St. Petersburg, Florida
122. 02/19/18: Conway Jr High Threat, Conway, Arkansas
123. 02/19/18: Mountain Pine School District Threat, Mountain Pine, Arkansas
124. 02/19/18: Calhoun Falls Charter School Bomb Threat, Calhoun Falls, South Carolina
125. 02/19-20/18: Westview Middle School Bomb Threat, Goose Creek, South Carolina
126. 03/2-21/18: Austin Serial Bombings, Austin, Texas
127. 03/27/18: Upper Darby Threat, Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania
128. 04/20/18: Forest High School, Ocala, Florida
129. 05/18/18: Santa Fe High School, Santa Fe, Texas
130. 05/25/18: Noblesville West Middle School, Noblesville, Indiana
131. 05/30/18: Spanish River Snapchat Threat, Boca Raton, Florida
132. 06/04/18: Buchanan High School Threat, Clovis, California
133. 10/18: Shelby County High Threat, Lawrenceburg, Kentucky

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134. 10/24/18: Bartow Florida Satanic Killer Thwarted Attack, Bartow, Florida
135. 10/27/18: Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
136. 10/22/18-11/01/18: United States Attempted Mail Bombing, Aventura, Florida
137. 12/08/18: Toledo Plot, Toledo, Ohio
138. 03/15/19: Christchurch Shootings, Christchurch, New Zealand
139. 04/07/19: Bonita Vista High Threat, Chula Vista, California
140. 04/26/19: Christchurch Revenge Plot, Los Angeles area, California
141. 04/30/19: UNCC Shooting, Charlotte, North Carolina
142. 05/20/19: Wiregrass Ranch High Threat, Wesley Chapel, Florida
143. 08/03/19: El Paso Walmart Shooting, El Paso, Texas
144. 08/05/19: Texas Grandma Thwarted Threat, Lubbock, Texas
145. 08/06/19: Florida Walmart Threat, Winter Park, Florida
146. 08/10/19: Texas Walmart Threat, Harlingen, Texas
147. 08/12/19: School Rezoning Threat, Lake Worth Beach, Florida
148. 08/12/19: Charles Town Threat, Charles Town, Virginia
149. 08/14/19: Albert Lea Threat, Albert Lea, Minnesota
150. 08/14/19: iFunny Threat, Boardman, Ohio
151. 08/15/19: Oakwood High Snapchat, Oakwood, Ohio
152. 08/15/19: Norwalk CT Thwarted Attack, Norwalk, Connecticut
153. 08/16/19: Edison High School Snapchat Threat, Fresno, California
154. 08/16/19: Volusia County Threat, Volusia County, Florida
155. 08/16/19: Claremore Facebook Threat, Claremore, Oklahoma
156. 08/18/19: Daytona Beach Text Threat, Daytona Beach, Florida
157. 08/19/19: Perry County Threat, Hazard, Kentucky
158. 08/19/19: Maui Tweet, Kahului, Hawaii
159. 08/19/19: Rapid City Threat, Rapid City, South Dakota
160. 08/20/19: UHD Snapchat Threat, Houston, Texas
161. 08/21/19: Marriott Threat, Long Beach, California
162. 08/21/19: Chicago Women's Reproductive Health Clinic Threat, Chicago, Illinois
163. 08/22/19: Nova High School Threat, Davie, Florida
164. 08/22/19: St. Mary Magdalen Threat, Altamonte Springs, Florida
165. 08/22/19: Burns Middle School Snapchat Threat, Brandon, Florida
166. 08/28/19: Gulf Coast High Snapchat Threat, Naples, Florida
167. 08/28/19: High Point University Threat, High Point, North Carolina
168. 08/29/19: St. Paul Threat, St. Paul, Minnesota
169. 09/08/19: Desert Hot Springs High School Threat, Desert Hot Springs, California
170. 09/13/19: Christopher Columbus High School Threat, Miami, Florida
171. 09/13/19: Gloucester Plot, Gloucester, England
172. 09/15/19: McAlester High Threat, McAlester, Oklahoma
173. 09/17/19: College Place High Threat, Walla Walla, Washington
174. 09/19/19: Riverside Middle School Snapchat, Watertown, Wisconsin
175. 09/24/19: Great Oak High School Threat, Temecula, California
176. 10/07/19: Lake Worth High School Snapchat Threat, Lake Worth Beach, Florida
177. 10/20/19: Albany High School, Albany, New York
178. 10/24/19: Cedar Ridge High School, Hillsborough, North Carolina
179. 10/27/19: Elmhurst College, Elmhurst, Illinois
180. 11/19: Valley Forge Kindergartener, Valley Forge, Pennsylvania

181. 11/01/19: Concord High Threat, Concord, New Hampshire
182. 11/01/19: Pizza Inn Shooting Threat, McAlester, Oklahoma
183. 11/05/19: West Hills College Threat, Lemoore, California
184. 11/06/19: Albion Middle School Threat, Orleans County, New York
185. 11/14/19: Saugus High School Shooting, Santa Clarita, California
186. 11/18/19: Ramona High School Threat, Riverside, California
187. 11/21/19: St. Mary's College, Moraga, California
188. 11/23/19: Ánimo Mae Jemison Charter Middle School, Los Angeles, California
189. 11/26/19: Tokay High Bathroom Wall, Lodi, California
190. 12/01/19: Cypress Bay High School Threat, Weston, Florida
191. 12/03/19: Estancia High Threats, Orange County, California
192. 12/06/19: Naval Air Base Shooting, Pensacola, Florida
193. 12/06/19: Falcon Cove Middle School Threat, Weston, Florida
194. 12/09/19: DeSoto Bathroom Threat, DeSoto, Texas
195. 12/11/19: Lakeland High School Threat, Suffolk, Virginia
196. 12/12/19: Henry M. Gunn Senior High School, Palo Alto, California
197. 12/16/19: Volusia County Threat, Volusia County, Florida
198. 01/03/20: Gulf Coast High Yolo Threat, Naples, Florida
199. 01/05/20: Napoleon Community Schools, Napoleon, Michigan
200. 01/19/20: Warrensburg High School, Warrensburg, New York
201. 01/22/20: Tallahassee Airport Graffiti, Tallahassee, Florida
202. 01/28/20: Waterloo Community School Bomb Threat, Waterloo, Iowa
203. 01/19/20: Huntsville High School, Huntsville, Alabama
204. 02/10/20: North Dorchester High School Threat, Dorchester County, Maryland
205. 02/12/20: School for Creative and Performing Arts Threat, Cincinnati, Ohio
206. 02/14/20: Mainland High School Threat, Daytona Beach, Florida



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